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Abstract In this paper, we introduce an approach that aims at increas-
ing individuals’ privacy awareness. We perform a privacy risk assessment
of the smartphone applications (apps) installed on a user’s device. We
implemented an app behaviour monitoring tool that collects informa-
tion about access to sensitive resources by each installed app. We then
calculate a privacy risk score using a fuzzy logic based approach that
considers type, number and frequency of access on resources. The com-
bination of these two concepts provides the user with information about
the privacy invasiveness level of the monitored apps. Our approach en-
ables users to make informed privacy decisions, i.e. restrict permissions
or report an app based on resource access events. We evaluate our ap-
proach by analysing the behaviour of selected apps and calculating their
associated privacy score. Initial results demonstrate the applicability of
our approach, which allows the comparison of apps by reporting to the
user the detected events and the resulting privacy risk score.
Keywords: smartphone apps; privacy; usability; beacon alarming; pri-
vacy risk score; fuzzy logic
1 Introduction
Security and privacy have always been a serious concern in the field of inform-
ation technology in diverse applications such as computer networks, wireless
communications, etc [1]. This is even more serious when it comes to smartphone
apps since they provide context-sensitive services to the users. The impressive
prosperity of the Android Operating System (OS) has become even more evident
with its domination over the smartphone market (with a share of 87.6% in 2016
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Q2 [2]). Its prevalence, and openness characteristics have facilitated the devel-
opment of apps with access to a multiplicity of sensitive resources, resulting in
highly personalised and context-sensitive services that benefit users’ online inter-
actions and consequently their daily lives. However, and not surprisingly, it has
also become the main target of a number of security and privacy related attacks
(e.g., 97% of malicious mobile malware [3] targets Android). Furthermore, the
huge proliferation of over-privileged apps also poses important privacy risks on
the users, who are often unaware of such risks [4].
In this regard, Android’s permission model has evolved from a binary one
to a more advanced one, which is based on the principle of least privilege [5];
this model enables users to selectively grant/deny specific permissions to each of
the installed apps even in run time. However, despite the recent advances, many
users continue to ignore those warnings and blindly grant most permissions to
apps as they request them [6]. Paradoxically, they continue to express discomfort
once they realise that their data are being collected without their informed
consent. As shown in [4], this behavior is mostly because of users not being fully
aware of the associated privacy risks, partly because of the lack of appropriate
information about the use of resources; i.e. which resources are being accessed
by which apps and with which frequency; and secondly, a poor understanding
of what the privacy consequences are. Thus, in this paper, we propose an app
behaviour monitoring tool called ’Beacon Alarming’ system, which makes users
aware of the extent to which an app is accessing sensitive resources. In particular,
it shows which resources are accessed with what frequency, and whether the
user was actually interacting with the app or not. Contrary to the state-of-the-
art approaches based on static analysis of code, our system does not require
the instrumentation of the Android OS. Secondly, we propose ’FAIR’ as a new
method for privacy risk assessment in smartphone apps by using fuzzy logic while
considering resource access. FAIR relies on the existence of the beacon alarming
system. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that fuzzy logic is
used as a decision-making method for privacy risk assessment in smartphone
apps. We further elaborate the proposed approach with a user-friendly GUI by
mapping the Android sensitive resources name to a more descriptive definition
to make it more persuasive and easy to understand for the users. Additionally,
once users are aware of the privacy issues, the GUI allows users to perform
two different actions, either block permissions, or report an app. Finally, we
empirically validate the functionality of our proposed approach through initial
experiments that monitor real apps behaviour.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the exist-
ing work in the literature. Section 3 introduces the proposed architecture of the
monitoring tool called beacon alarming. In Section 4 we introduce the proposed
method for privacy risk assessment of smartphone apps called FAIR. Section
5 examines and evaluates the functionality of the proposed approach. Finally,
we present the main conclusions and point out our future research direction in
Section 6.
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2 Related Work
Several efforts have been done to improve the user awareness of privacy and
help them to make informed decisions [7–9]. These approaches are based on
the advantages of including privacy facts in app descriptions in the app stores.
Although, it was believed that this would enable users to make more rational
decisions before downloading an app. These approaches could not efficiently op-
erate. This is due to the fact that, during installation, users usually pay limited
attention to permission screens and have poor understanding of what the per-
missions mention. In [10], the authors introduced a method to make smartphone
apps more privacy-friendly through automated testing, detecting and analys-
ing privacy violations. They suggested the use of an automated privacy-testing
system to efficiently explore an app’s functionality, logging relevant events at
multiple levels of abstraction as the app executes, and using these logs to accur-
ately characterise app behavior. Although this is an interesting method, there
is no fine-grained formulation for their proposed privacy-testing system, as well
as no practical implementation. There are also some approaches based on fine-
grained control over permissions and majority voting recommendations [11–13].
These approaches enable users to turn on and off the access to sensitive data
or functionality (e.g. SMS, camera, microphone, contacts, etc.) on an app-by-
app basis to determine whether they feel comfortable granting it or not. In fact,
in such solutions, a privacy control approach is provided to enable selectively
granting, denying or confining access to specific permissions on a certain app.
This of course is inline with our research and as well with the most recent An-
droid’s permission model. Nevertheless, such solutions must be complemented
with additional mechanisms that will first enable users to better understand the
behavior of apps and the privacy implications. Following this direction, the au-
thors in [14], proposed to identify permission hungry apps by considering the set
of permissions declared by apps in the Apps store, and making a comparison of
the commonly used permission in order to make users aware of apps asking for
rare or too many permissions. Authors in [15] explored the privacy behavior of
apps based on the analysis of data flows which required the instrumentation of
Android.
Our approach complements previous research in the sense that, the beacon
alarming component analyses app privacy-related behaviour providing more
scalability as it does not require to modify the Android OS, therefore, no re-
distribution/installation of a customise OS is required. Our component is privacy-
preserving as all information is processed locally (rule-based engine) and does
not leave the user’s device. Furthermore, our approach does not analyse the
data flows, therefore, mechanisms, such as proxies monitoring users communica-
tions are not required. . We, in turn, focus on providing users with only relevant
privacy-related information of apps using more understandable indicators. We
encourage users to report privacy aggressive practices of apps based on access to
individual resources. The FAIR component advances the state of the art in the
calculation of a privacy score using fuzzy logic as a decision-making approach
and additionally improves the scalability.
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3 Beacon Alarming: Log monitoring tool
In this section we introduce the methodology that we followed for the imple-
mentation of our proposed monitoring tool called Beacon Alarming [16]. This
tool reads the logs generated by AppOps - a privacy manager tool which was
introduced by Google in Android 4.3 and which is now inaccessible, unless the
device is rooted [17]. We monitored the permission requests done by each selec-
ted app. Afterwards, we implemented a user awareness component. The access
events were analysed and communicated to the user by our awareness module.
The outcome of the monitoring tool (it is worth mentioning that our monitoring
tool does not require any root access, modification to the Android OS, etc. See
Section 3.1). We also use the results obtained from beacon alarming as the input
for FAIR component which is described in detail in Section 4.
3.1 Data collection
The goal of this process was to collect data about the accesses to the device
resources that each of the selected apps had done, in particular those privacy
related. To this end, we focused on the Android permissions classification. Gen-
erally, permissions are classified as ’normal’ and ’dangerous’ [5].
1. Normal: There are permissions that do not pose much risk to the user’s
privacy or the device’s operation. Thus, the system automatically grants
these permissions.
2. Dangerous: There are permissions that could potentially affect the user’s
privacy or the device’s normal operation. Therefore, the system asks the
user to explicitly grant these permissions.
We implemented a module that is able to monitor access events to both nor-
mal and dangerous permissions. Our tool was designed in such a way that we
could select which app to be monitored. Thus, the data collection was done by
our tool which read the logs generated by the Android’s AppOps manager and
collected those entries related to the selected apps and privacy related permis-
sions. As an important note, we identified that the root access is only needed to
access the AppOps management system, e.g. to tell the system to deny access to
one of the operations that is controlled by AppOps. As a result, we found that
in order to view the AppOps logs, there is no need to root the device, and they
are accessible to any app with debugging privilege. In order to collect the logs,
a timer event is sent to the PermissionUsageLogger service periodically. When
it is received, the logger queries the AppOps service running on the device for a
list of apps that have used any of the operations we are tracking. We then check
through that list and for any selected app that has used an operation recently,
we store the time at which that operation was used in a local data base. These
entries are also used to get a usage count.
FAIR: Fuzzy Alarming Index Rule for Privacy Analysis in Smartphone Apps 5
Fig. 1. The proposed beacon alarming (a) list of suspicious apps (b) details of
accesses (c) selectively choosing apps to be monitored, and (d) reporting based
on the app’s behaviour.
3.2 User interface and communication
In order to provide users with a better understanding of which resources were ac-
cessed with what frequency by different apps, we implemented a privacy aware-
ness module (See Fig. 1). In this module users could select which apps to be
monitored, and as a result the module displays a summary of apps and resources
accessed including the corresponding timestamps. To increase the usability as-
pects, we mapped/translated the permissions from those defined by Android to
a common language definition. Furthermore, we implement a rule-based mech-
anism that analysed the behaviour of the app in order to inform the user about
unexpected behaviours. An example of these rules can be seen in Fig. 2 (due
to space limitations, we refrained from representing of all the rules). Finally,
to encourage users to take actions when potential privacy risks were detected,
our module provided the interfaces to either restrict a permission or to report
a resource and therefore, raise awareness of misconduct behaviors and access to
sensitive data.
Restrict permissions We provided the interface for direct access to the permission
manager system in Android, which allows users to revoke/grant permissions for
any app.
Report permissions We developed a semi-automatic reporting tool, where users
could select to report an app based on the resource that implied privacy risks.
With this tool we aim to simplify the app reporting task and encourage users to
report privacy related issues.
3.3 Formalisation of resource accesses
Based on the classification introduced in Section 3.1, we initially consider the set
of permissions P = {p1, . . . , pn} consisting of two subsets NP = {np1, . . . , npm}
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Fig. 2. An example of rules for app privacy invasiveness detection.
and DP = {dp1, . . . , dpu} where NP and DP show the level of permission which
is either normal or dangerous, respectively. We also introduce the set of apps by
A = {a1, . . . , aw}. Let Fai = {f1, . . . , fe} be the set of features for each app ai,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ w. Each fj (1 ≤ j ≤ e) consists of ordered pairs {(pj , npk|dpl)}.
We determine each feature as an informative element regarding each app. As a
result, the set of features related to all app is defined as {Fa1 , . . . , Faw}, where
Fa1 represents the feature Fa1 associated with app a1. Moreover, we denote the
used permission pk (1 ≤ k ≤ n) in P by app ai (1 ≤ i ≤ w) in A while the
level of permission npg ∈ NP (1 ≤ g ≤ m) or dpf ∈ DP (1 ≤ f ≤ u) by
Lai,pk = (ai, pk). Additionally, we formulate the problem by xai,pk as follows:
xai,pk =
1 if Lai,pk = (ai, pk).
0 otherwise,
(1)
where if there permission pk is used by app ai (Lai,pk), then xai,pk = 1, otherwise
xai,pk = 0.
4 FAIR: Fuzzy Alarming Index Rule
This section introduces FAIR, a novel approach which uses fuzzy logic in order to
provide a privacy risks assessment of selected apps. The FAIR approach benefits
from the beacon alarming system introduced in Section 3, as shown in Fig. 3 and
detailed in Algorithm 1. We exploit fuzzy logic as an appropriate method that
is widely adopted in a mixed variety of IT systems such as wireless networks,
intrusion detection systems, etc. [18–20], especially, as it has been extensively
employed as the core of decision-making systems [21]. The output of a fuzzy
controller is obtained from the fuzzification of inputs using the associated mem-
bership functions (MFs). A crisp input is then converted into different members
of the associated MFs (based on its value). MF maps the elements of a crisp in-
put into numerical values in the interval [0, 1] and it represents the membership
degrees of a variable to a given set. In the following, the expected inputs and
output are described.
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Fig. 3. A high level architecture of FAIR.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code of all steps in FAIR.
1. Procedure FAIR
2. START
3. Define linguistic variables and terms
4. Construct membership functions AND rule base
6. START Fuzzification
7. Calculate γ = T tai |tDP \N tai AND δ = Dtai |NP \N tai
7. Convert crisp input data to fuzzy values using MFs
8. START Inference
9. Evaluate rules in the rule base
10. Combine results of each rule
11. START Defuzzification
7. Calculate B∗ =
∑5
i=1 COAi.Areai \
∑5
i=1 Areai
10. Convert output data to non-fuzzy values
12. END Defuzzification
13. END Inference
13. END Fuzzification
14. END Procedure
4.1 Fuzzification
The fuzzification process converts crisp data (inputs) into MFs (fuzzy data).
Definition 1. Let γ indicate the first input of FAIR. γ is then defined as follows:
γ =
T tai |DP
N tai
, (2)
where T tai |DP represents the total number of accesses that app ai has (in time t)
to the dangerous privacy sensitive permissions (DPs), e.g. READ_CONTACTS, etc.,
and N tai shows the total number of accesses that app ai has to the permissions
(both DPs and NPs). It is evident that, the value of γ is always in the range
[0, 1]. γ at its worst case is 1, which means that the app only accesses DPs.
The rationale behind this formulation is to investigate the impact of the access
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frequency to privacy sensitive DPs.
Definition 2. Let δ indicate the second input of FAIR. δ is then defined as
follows:
δ =
Dtai |NP
N tai
, (3)
where Dtai |NP represents the total number of accesses that a given app ai has
to privacy sensitive NPs (discussed in Section 3.1, such as ACCESS_WIFI_STATE.
The main idea behind this mathematical model is to evaluate the importance
of accesses to privacy sensitive NPs. Because of the capability of fuzzy logic in
supporting and implementing decision making systems, it enables us to figure
out the impact of both γ and δ on the overall evaluation of privacy risk scores
(PRSs) simultaneously.
Definition 3. Let A1, A2, and A3 represent the crisp sets. Then, µB1 : A1 →
[0, 1], µB2 : A2 → [0, 1] and µB3 : A3 → [0, 1] are called the MFs of B1, B2 and
B3, which define the fuzzy sets B1, B2 and B3 of A1, A2 and A3. To perform
fuzzification process, we should map crisp sets into fuzzy sets as follows (B1 and
B2 indicate the inputs, and B3 shows the output):
B1 = γ ∈ {low,medium,high} , B2 = δ ∈ {low,medium,high} . (4)
B3 = Privcy Risk Score ∈ {VL,L,M,H.VH} . (5)
Remark 1. The fuzzy variable γ has three fuzzy states including: low, medium
and high, and its MFs are shown by Fig. 4(a).
Remark 2. The fuzzy variable δ has three fuzzy states including: low, medium
and high, and its MFs are shown by Fig. 4(b).
Remark 3. The output represents the privacy risk score (PRS) and has five
fuzzy states including: VL (Very Low), L (Low), M (Medium), H (High), and
VH (Very High). Also, its MFs are shown by Fig. 4(c).
As it was previously mentioned, the fuzzy rules are directly obtained based
on the number of states defined for the inputs, i.e. the more states we define for
the inputs, the more fuzzy rules we need to initiate. Thus, to keep the imple-
mentation overhead of our fuzzy inference system (FIS) low [21], three states for
each input and five states for the output have been defined with respect to the
expert knowledge.
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Fig. 4. Fuzzy membership functions (a) B1 (γ), (b) B2 (δ), and (c) B3 (PRS).
4.2 Fuzzy controller rules
The control rule is the core of every FIS. To obtain the fuzzy output, a combin-
ation of MFs with the control rules is required. In this paper, we use a standard
Mamdani type fuzzy system [21] using a bipartite fuzzifier (since we have two
inputs). We show the collection of R fuzzy IF-THEN rules as follows:
∀Ri : ∃ b1 AND b2 | IF b1 isBi1, b2 isBi2, THEN b3 isBi3, (6)
where Bi1, B
i
2, and B
i
3 are fuzzy states which were defined in the previous section,
respectively. To obtain the fuzzy system output, we should define the fuzzy
rules. In a Mamdani fuzzy system, the number of possible rules is defined as
Ninputs ×Nmf, where Ninputs is the number of inputs, and Nmf is the number of
MFs. As a result, we have nine fuzzy rules (32 = 9) which are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: FIS Rules
No. B1 B2 B3
1 low low VL
2 low medium L
3 low high H
4 medium low M
5 medium medium M
6 medium high H
7 high low VH
8 high medium VH
9 high high VH
For the sake of simplicity, we used a trapezoidal function to model the fuzzy
sets. So that, the calculations of MFs are simpler, as opposite to other functions
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such as Sigmoidal, Guassian, etc. The trapezoidal function T is defined as below:
T (b1; ε,m1,m2, ζ) =

b1−ε
m1−ε , if b1 ∈ [ε,m1] .
1, if b1 ∈ [m1,m2] .
ζ−b1
ζ−m2 , if b1 ∈ [m2, ζ] .
0, otherwise.
(7)
In (7), ε and ζ, and m1 and m2 are the valleys and climaxes, respectively.
This trapezoidal function maps b1 to a value between [0, 1] and the degree of
membership called µ(b1) is then generated. In fact, we should use (7) to obtain
the membership degrees of B1, B2 and B3 (µB1(b1), µB2(b2), and µB3(b3)). In
other words, µB1(b1), µB2(b2), µB3(b3) ∈ [0, 1], and B1 = (b1, µB1(b1)|b1 ∈ A1),
B2 = (b2, µB2(b2)|b2 ∈ A2) , and B3 = (b3, µB3(b3)|b3 ∈ A3).
4.3 Defuzzification
Defuzzification is aimed to discover the numerical result of our fuzzy system and
calculate the crisp output B∗. We use the center of areas (COA) method for
defuzzification [21]. In this method, the fuzzy logic controller first calculates the
area under the scaled MFs and within the range of the output variable. Then,
it uses the following equation to calculate the geometric center of this area:
COA =
∫
µz(z)zdz∫
µz(z).dz
. (8)
5 Analysis and Results
In this section, we evaluate the functionality of our proposed approach. In our
experimental setup, we have chosen three sets (categories) of apps in which, each
set comprises five apps (in total 15 apps). The rationale behind the selection of
those apps is as follows: we selected those apps resulting from the first search
result page when the user type a certain keyword. The keywords were selected
from the most popular app categories. The selected apps were chosen from the
top charts in Google Play store, i.e. apps with more than one million downloads.
Fig. 5 depicts a graphical representation of the proposed FIS that lets us examine
the output surface of the FIS for any one or two inputs. In other words, this
graphical interface simply shows us how γ (B1) and δ (B2) are mapped to the
output (B3). The colors change according to the output values.
5.1 Theoretical analysis
In this subsection, we mathematically analyse the functionality of FAIR in es-
timating privacy risk scores (B∗). Fig. 6 re-illustrates the MFs for the output
which were previously shown by Fig. 4(c). Let N and D be the numerator and
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Fig. 5. The graphical structure of the proposed FIS for privacy risk assessment.
Fig. 6. Calculation of B∗.
denominator of (8), respectively. Then, we have:
N =
[∫ 0.18
0
(0.2)zdz +
∫ 0.35
0.18
(
z − 0.18
3
)
zdz +
∫ 0.65
0.35
(0.5)zdz
+
∫ 0.68
0.65
(
z − 0.65
2
)
zdz +
∫ 0.83
0.68
(0.7)zdz +
∫ 0.9
0.83
(0.9− z)zdz
]
.
(9)
D =
[∫ 0.18
0
(0.2)dz +
∫ 0.35
0.18
(
z − 0.18
3
)
dz +
∫ 0.65
0.35
(0.5)dz
+
∫ 0.68
0.65
(
z − 0.65
2
)
dz +
∫ 0.83
0.68
(0.7)dz +
∫ 0.9
0.83
(0.9− z)dz
]
.
(10)
If we show the crisp output by B∗, then:
B∗ =
N
D
=
0.16153
0.2984917
' 0.54. (11)
The value of B∗ (0.54) belongs to membership function M (Medium), where
γ (B1) is whether low (when the number of accesses to normal permissions
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is negligible), medium (when the number of accesses to normal permissions is
moderate, which is between [0.3, 0.6]), or high (when the number of accesses
to normal permissions is remarkable, which is between [0.7, 1.0]), and δ (B2)
is whether high (when the number of accesses to dangerous permissions is sig-
nificantly high), medium (when the number of access to dangerous permissions
is average, which is between [0.3, 0.6]), or low (when the number of access to
dangerous permissions is too less). This value means that the combination of
dangerous accesses and normal accesses w.r.t the associated fuzzy rules, leads to
the situation in which FAIR decides that the overall PRS is M (Medium).
5.2 Experimental analysis
The experiment consists of two separate phases that each took three days. In
the first phase of the experiment, we only granted the permissions which are
necessary for these 15 apps to work properly. Accordingly, we opened them once
and allowed to run in the background without user interaction. Afterwards, we
collected and analysed the resources that all these 15 apps were accessing (i.e.
permission requests). Fig. 7 shows the results of our analysis (the numbers in
each cell show the times that each app had accessed a given permission).
Fig. 7. Result of app monitoring for the first phase of the experiment.
In the second phase of the experiment, we granted as many permissions as
possible to the apps (both normal and dangerous). Afterwards, we monitored
them to investigate which one is extensively accessing permissions, even when
there is no apparent reason for accessing that permission. It is worth to mention
that, during the second phase the only interaction was creating an account in
the corresponding apps. The results of this phase is shown in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 8. Result of app monitoring for the second phase of the experiment.
5.3 Initial results
Fig. 9 shows the main results of the two phase experiment. As we can observe,
all the PRSs associated with each app has been measured by FAIR based on the
resources that they have accessed. It is important to note that we only focused
on the resource accesses that are directly related to the users’ privacy, e.g. an app
which had accessed WAKE_LOCK permission was not considered while calculating
PRS since this resource access is hardware-oriented.
Fig. 10 shows all the changes that we observed during performing both phases
of the experiment regarding each app. This is a sensible way to figure out the
variations of PRSs for each installed app to imagine a general overview regarding
the privacy invasive behaviours of the apps. It is evident that the invasiveness
degree of Social Networks and Dating & Friends apps has tangibly increased
since they have unreasonably accessed dangerous permissions even if the user
does nothing with the smartphone, e.g. our findings showed that some apps of
these two categories had accessed to certain kinds of dangerous permissions (e.g.
Camera) even if the smartphone was not being used.
5.4 Discussion
Our findings confirm a considerable difference between the PRSs in both phases
of the experiment. This backs up the point that users must pay careful attention
while they grant a dangerous permission to an app. This is why we implemented
beacon alarming in such a way as to support users for granting/limiting per-
missions that they feel they might be offended. Moreover, in calculating PRSs,
we neglected accesses to the external storage. The logic behind this is twofold.
First, in Android there is no way to discriminate different accesses to storage,
e.g. we cannot find whether the app accessed photo, video, etc. Second, all apps
can read and write files placed on the external storage. It means, this is the
basic permissions for every app. Moreover, we have categorised all the resource
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Fig. 9. Associated PRSs with each app calculated by FAIR.
accesses, and we only focus on the resources that are directly related to the users’
privacy.
The scope of this paper comprises Android OS. Regardless of the choice of the
research area, the proposed approach for monitoring resources cannot be applied
to other smartphone platforms (e.g. iOS). Furthermore, integrating additional
methods of data collection (e.g. user perceptions) could have increased the scope
and depth of analyses.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a new paradigm towards protecting privacy in smart-
phone ecosystems. FAIR provides a high flexible architecture by applying fuzzy
logic to measure the privacy risk score of apps; thanks to the monitoring tool,
FAIR is able to inform users about privacy invasive behaviour of apps installed
on their devices. To realise the promising properties of FAIR, the essential math-
ematical formulation, including analysis of normal and dangerous accesses was
introduced. Moreover, the GUI has been designed in such a way that we tried
to encourage users to review their permissions more efficiently and report apps
that showed privacy aggressive practices. We believe that the findings and in-
sights discussed in this paper can encourage privacy researchers to devise more
and better privacy functions to address current privacy challenges in smartphone
ecosystems. In our future work, we intend to consider not only the behavior of
each installed app, but also the expected functionality and declared permissions
requirements when measuring the privacy risk score. Furthermore, we aim to
carry out an extensive user study in order to better understand the importance
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Fig. 10. A comparison between results obtained from both phases of the
experiment.
of different privacy related resources, as well as the benefits and potential needs
of FAIR from the user perspective.
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